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I. INTRODUCTION
Life insurance is often an important family asset, and the proceeds from
that insurance may represent a significant part of an individual's estate after
death. For reasons of control and convenience, the insured usually owns the
policy on his own life at the time of his death, but the federal tax laws offer
inducements to the insured while living to arrange for the ownership of the
insurance by another, typically a family member or family trust. Regardless
of the ownership, disposition of the insurance proceeds on the death of the
insured becomes an important part of the family estate plan. Within broad
*James Lewis Parks Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. A.B.,
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limits, the policy owner may direct the disposition of the proceeds as he sees
fit, I and the comments to follow address only one of the many available
choices: how to combine life insurance proceeds with other property of the
insured in a unified or integrated estate plan.
Recent developments in state and federal law make an examination of
this topic timely. Missouri has adopted new probate legislation that authorizes
independent administration of estates and modifies the marital property
rights of surviving spouses. 2 The Missouri inheritance tax law has been
repealed and a new estate tax law adopted.3 Rulings and court decisions con-
tain important interpretations of established principles relating to the transfer
taxation of life insurance proceeds. 4 Significant amendments to the federal
estate and gift tax laws were enacted in 1976, 5 1978,6 and 1981. 7 These
developments may affect both the decision to combine insurance proceeds
with other estate assets in a single estate plan and the choice of how to do it.
There are a number of possible objectives in combining life insurance
proceeds with other property in one estate plan: (1) to provide funds to pay
transfer costs, i.e., debts, taxes, and administration expenses at death; (2)
to provide funds for cash distributions to estate beneficiaries; (3) to facilitate
the insured's desire to defer disposition of estate property to estate
beneficiaries through trust or other arrangements; (4) to protect estate
beneficiaries from improvidence and the claims of creditors; and (5) to
preserve the estate by transfers that minimize income and transfer taxes and
estate transfer costs to the beneficiaries of the estate. It may be possible to
accomplish one or more of these objectives without combining life insurance
proceeds with other assets in a single estate plan, but it is often simpler and
more effective when all of the property is combined in a single plan.
Typically, an insured will want to retain control over the disposition of
his life insurance proceeds while living. Such control, if held directly, is an
incident of policy ownership and may have unwanted transfer tax
consequences.8 These comments address the common situation where the
insured will insist on control over the disposition of policy proceeds while
living and hence will own the policy at death. An interesting development
1. Walker v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 141 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Mo. 1940);
Forester v. Bellville, 513 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. App., St. L. 1974); Service Life
Ins. Go. v. Davis, 466 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. App., K.G. 1971).
2. MO. REV. STAT. § 473.780-.843 (Gum. Supp. 1981) (independent ad-
ministration); id. §§ 452.330, 474.163-.235 (marital rights).
3. Id. §§ 145.009-.995.
4. See text accompanying notes 55-89 infra.
5. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title XX, 90 Stat. 1520,
1846-97.
6. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, Subtitle B, 92 Stat. 2763,
2881-84.
7. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, Title IV, 95
Stat. 172, 299-323.
8. See Parts II.A. & B. infra.
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to be discussed is the possibility that an insured who does not own the policy
may have indirect, or de facto, control over the proceeds through the terms
of a will or revocable trust.
There are two common methods for combining life insurance proceeds
with other estate assets. By the first method the insured directs payment of
the proceeds to the personal representative of his estate. The proceeds become
probate property and the terms of the insured~s will control their disposi-
tion in the same manner as other probate property.9 This will be referred
to as "payment to the estate."
By the second method the insured establishes a revocable trust while liv-
ing and directs payment of the proceeds to the trustee of that trust. The
revocable trust contains the estate plan of the insured and, in conjunction
with the trust, he executes a will that "pours over" into the trust the pro-
bate property of the estate.10 This is "payment to a revocable trust."
By a third, but less common, method the insured directs payment of
the proceeds to the trustee of a trust established in the insured's will. Unlike
the first method, this designation does not make the insurance proceeds pro-
bate property. This method has support in decisions of the Missouri Supreme
Court,"1 even without the benefit of enabling legislation, 12 and is referred
to as "payment to a testamentary trustee."
Application of state and federal law may differ depending on the method
of combination selected. The rights of the insured's creditors to reach the
insurance proceeds may be involved;13 proceeds paid to the estate are more
exposed than those paid to a revocable or testamentary trust. Similarly, ex-
posure to administration expenses-particularly fees of personal represen-
tatives and attorneys-is greater for proceeds paid to the estate than those
paid to a revocable or testamentary trust. Marital property rights of the in-
sured's surviving spouse may differ under the various methods of combina-
tion. Exposure to federal and state transfer taxes may also differ under the
various methods of combination, especially if the insured is not the owner
of the policy at the time of his death. The willingness of an insurance com-
pany to accept a particular beneficiary designation is also important; there
has been more reluctance on the part of some insurers to accept a direction
to pay to a testamentary trustee than to the estate or a revocable trust.' 4
This Article will analyze the various methods of combining life insurance
9. See Part II.C. 1. infra.
10. See Parts III.A. & B.2. infra.
11. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958); Tootle-
Lacy National Bank v. Rollier, 340 Mo. 1027, 111 S.W.2d 12 (1937).
12. See G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 5 239, at 89-90 &
n.55 (2d rev. ed. 1977).
13. See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States, 4
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583 (1957); text accompanying notes 143-51 infra.
14. See Lawthers, Testamentay Trusts as Beneficiaries Under Life Insurance Policies,
C.L.U. J., Fall 1955, at 307, 320-22. See also Part VI. infra.
1982]
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proceeds with other estate property in light of these three considerations:
(1) transfer taxes; (2) rights of creditors, beneficiaries, and others; and (3)
rights of the surviving spouse.
II. TRANSFER TAXES
Life insurance proceeds may constitute the principal liquid asset of the
estate, and the diminution of this asset by unnecessary transfer costs should
be avoided. A principal concern for the policy owner in selecting a beneficiary
designation may be to minimize transfer tax costs to the greatest extent
possible.
Transfer taxes include federal gift' 5 and estate' 6 taxes, Missouri estate
tax,1 7 and the federal transfer tax on generation skipping transfers. 8 A discus-
sion of the tax consequences of generation skipping transfers is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is clear that the disposition of life insurance pro-
ceeds through a trust or trust equivalent may involve application of this com-
plicated legislation.' 9
Since January 1, 1981, the death tax in Missouri is equal to the max-
imum credit allowable under the federal estate tax law for state death taxes.
20
The Missouri estate tax is thus directly related to the federal estate tax; the
same property that produces a federal estate tax produces a Missouri estate
tax. To the extent that life insurance proceeds are subject to the federal estate
tax, they are also subject to the Missouri tax. This contrasts with the inheri-
tance tax in effect beforeJanuary 1, 1981, where life insurance proceeds were
exempt from Missouri death taxes unless payable to the estate of the
insured. 21
For an estate subject to the federal estate tax, transfer taxes are of primary
importance in plans to minimize transfer costs. Because of this importance,
the paragraphs that follow include a brief history of the rules applied to life
insurance policies and their proceeds.
A. Federal Estate Tax
Proceeds of life insurance policies first became subject to the federal estate
tax in 1918. All amounts paid to the estate (receivable by the executor) were
subject to the tax, while a total of $40,000 of proceeds paid to other
beneficiaries was exempt. 22 It became necessary under this provision to decide
if the $40,000 exemption was available when proceeds were payable to a
15. I.R.a. §§ 2501-2524 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
16. Id. §§ 2001-2209.
17. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 145.009-.995 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
18. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2622 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
19. Id. § 2611(d)(2); Prop. Treas. Reg. 26.2611-4 (1981).
20. MO. REV. STAT. § 145.011 (Gum. Supp. 1981).
21. Id. § 145.020.3(3) (1978) (repealed 1980).
22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 402, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097-98.
[Vol. 47664
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testamentary trust created by the insured rather than to his estate. 23 Amend-
ments in 194224 retained the rule for proceeds paid to the estate, removed
the $40,000 exemption, and added two new alternative tests for including
life insurance proceeds in the insured's estate tax estate. Under the premium
payments test, life insurance proceeds were included in the insured's estate
tax estate in the proportion that the premiums paid directly or indirectly
by the insured bore to the total premiums paid for the insurance. 25 If the
decedent insured had paid all the premiums, all of the proceeds were included
in his estate tax estate; if he paid half of the premiums, only half of the pro-
ceeds were included in the estate, provided he did not own the policy at his
death. Under the alternative ownership test, the entire proceeds of a policy
were included in the insured's estate tax estate if at death he possessed any
of the incidents of ownership of the policy, exercisable alone or in conjunc-
tion with any other person.26
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 included the estate tax provision
for life insurance proceeds that is now in effect. 27 The premium payments
test was deleted, but the ownership and payment to the estate tests were re-
tained. Even though premium payments by the insured no longer create
liability under the life insurance section of the estate tax law, the Internal
Revenue Service has been successful in applying the premium payments test
to transfers of life insurance policies and to premium payments by gift in
contemplation of death or, after 1976, within three years of the insured's
death. Although Congress repealed the three-year rule for most transfers
of decedents who die after 1981, the rule for transfers with respect to life
insurance policies was retained. 28 Thus, the proceeds of life insurance to-
day can be exposed to federal estate taxes in three ways: (1) when the pro-
ceeds are payable to the estate; (2) when the insured possessed any of the in-
cidents of ownership at the time of his death; and (3) when the insured makes
a gift of the policy and premium payments within three years of his death.
Ownership is the most significant of these three tests, and a large body of
case law, Internal Revenue Service rulings, and commentary exists on the
many questions involving incidents of ownership possessed by the insured
at the time of death. 29
23. Generally, payment to a testamentary trustee was not payment to the dece-
dent's estate. See cases cited note 123 infra.
24. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 404(a), 56 Stat. 798, 944-45.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 2042 (1976).
28. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95
Stat. 172, 317 (codified at I.R.C. § 2035(b)(2), (d)(1) (Supp. V 1981)). Seealso notes
53-54 and accompanying text infra.
29. For good discussions of the developments in this area, see D. KAHN & E.
COLSON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF ESTATES, GIFTS, AND TRUSTS 102-111 (2d ed.
1975); C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER &J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 330-35 (3d ed. 1974); R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD, S. LIND &D. CALFEE,
1982]
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Two other features of the federal estate tax important to planning the
disposition of life insurance proceeds are the estate tax exemption level and
the marital deduction for property passing to the surviving spouse in a
qualified manner. Before 1977, the exemption in the estate tax estate was
$60,000.30 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 raised the exemption level in steps
to a maximum of $175,625 for 1981 and future years.3 ' Then, in one of the
1981 act's most significant changes, Congress further raised the exemption
level in increments to $600,000 for 1987 and later years. 32
Before 1977, the estate tax marital deduction for property passing in
a qualified form to a surviving spouse was limited in the aggregate to fifty
percent of the estate tax estate. 3 The Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased
the maximum marital deduction to $250,000 for estates up to $500,000 but
retained the fifty percent aggregate limitation for estates in excess of
$500,000.34 Another significant 1981 amendment authorized, for the first
time, an unlimited gift and estate tax deduction for qualified transfers to
a surviving spouse by individuals dying after 1981.35 The newly revised
marital deduction affords a complete exemption from the federal estate tax
for life insurance proceeds passing to a surviving spouse in a qualified form.
If the estate tax estate is equal to or less than the exemption level, there
can be no federal or Missouri estate tax liability.3 6 Even if the estate tax estate
exceeds the exemption level, the marital deduction for property passing to
the surviving spouse may reduce the estate to an amount that does not ex-
ceed the maximum permissible exemption.
Family estate planning for a married couple seeking to minimize transfer
tax costs will make effective use of the exemption levels available to both
spouses and the marital deduction available to the estate of the first spouse
to die. This planning process can be facilitated if life insurance proceeds are
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 4-293 to 4-302 (4th ed. 1978). Seealso Treas.
Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1974), enumerating the common incidents of ownership which
in a particular case will depend on the type of life insurance policy in question.
30. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2052, 68A Stat. 1, 389 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2052) (repealed 1976).
31. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), (b)(2), 90 Stat.
1520, 1848-49 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1976)) (amended 1981).
32. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401(a), (b),
95 Stat. 172, 299 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1976)).
33. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056(c), 68A Stat. 1, 394
(codified at I.R.C. § 2056(c)) (repealed 1981).
34. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1520,
1854 (codified at I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1976)) (amended 1981).
35. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a), (b),
95 Stat. 172, 301-04 (amending I.R.C. § 2056 (1976)).
36. I.R.C. § 2010 (1976 &Supp. V 1981) (federal estate tax); id. § 2011 (state
estate taxes); Mo. REV. STAT. § 145.011 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (Missouri estate tax).
The federal estate tax credit for state death taxes cannot exceed the federal estate
tax reduced by the amount of the unified transfer tax credit. I.R.C. § 201 1(f) (1976).
[Vol. 47
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combined with other property in a single estate plan. After the recent in-
creases in exemption levels and the marital deduction, the techniques for
making optimal use of these devices will change. A discussion of these techni-
ques is beyond the scope of this Article.
B. Federal Gift Tax
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 unified the separate federal gift and estate
taxes, making the same rates apply to both37 and adopting one exemption
level for both.3 8 One purpose of this unification was to remove some of the
transfer tax advantages available to those persons able to make substantial
gifts while living. 39 Despite these changes, significant transfer tax advan-
tages remain for lifetime gifts, and these advantages are magnified in the
case of life insurance because of the large disparity that may exist between
the gift tax value of the policy and its estate tax value (the policy proceeds).
Frequently the gift tax value of the policy is so relatively small compared
to its estate tax value that transfer tax consequences alone may dictate that
the insured not own the insurance policy on his life.
4 0
Generally, life insurance policies are assignable under state law, and case
authority in Missouri confirms this view. 41 The validity of an assignment
is measured not only by state law but by the terms of the particular policy.
If the owner-insured makes a valid transfer of all incidents of ownership of
a policy by gift, he has made a federal gift tax transfer.4 2 That transfer will
normally qualify for the present interest gift tax exclusion, 43 the split gift
privilege for gifts by married persons to others, 44 and the gift tax marital
deduction if the transfer is by the insured to his spouse. 45 If the insured con-
tinues to pay premiums on the policy, each premium payment is an addi-
tional gift tax transfer;46 normally each payment also qualifies for the pre-
37. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(1), (b)(1), 90 Stat.
1520, 1846-49 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2502 (1976)).
38. Id. § 2001(a)(2), (b)(2), 90 Stat. at 1848-49 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2010,
2505 (1976)).
39. U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 566 (1976).
40. J. MUNCH, LIFE INSURANCE IN ESTATE PLANNING 243,511 (1981).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 313 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. App., K.C. 1958).
42. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958).
43. Baer v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 285, 289, aff'd, 149 F.2d 638
(8th Cir. 1945); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503(a) (1958); Rev. Rul. 55-408, 1955-1 C.B.
113.
44. I.R.C. § 2513 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8044080
(1980).
45. Kidd v. Patterson, 230 F. Supp. 769, 774 (N.D. Ala. 1964); I.R.C. § 2523
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
46. Halsted v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1069, 1075 (1957) (power of
withdrawal over trust corpus); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1958).
1982] 667
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sent interest gift tax exclusion, 47 the split gift privilege for a gift to someone
other than the donor's spouse, 48 and the gift tax marital deduction for a gift
to a spouse.
4 9
The gift tax value of a life insurance policy is generally its replacement
value, 50 and regulations indicate that the gift tax value of a policy on which
further premium payments are to be made may be approximated by adding
to the interpolated terminal reserve at the date of the gift a proportionate
part of the last premium that covers the period extending beyond the date
of the gift.51 The gift tax value of a premium payment is generally the amount
of the premium, whether the insurance is term, whole life, or other.5 2
The transfer of a life insurance policy by the insured within three years
of his death and the payment of premiums by the insured during that period
on a policy on his life do not benefit from the estate tax exclusion available
for certain present interest gift transfers made within three years of the
donor's death. 53 Moreover, transfer of a life insurance policy by a donor
within three years of his death or payment of premiums on such a policy
is an estate, not a gift, transfer. The Internal Revenue Service asserts-
and its position has been sustained in several court decisions-that a gift
transfer of a life insurance policy by the insured within three years of his
death is a transfer of the proceeds of the policy, not of the gift tax value of
the policy adjusted to the date of death, and the 1981 amendments to the
three-year rule reflect that view. 54
Two recent developments respecting the transfer tax consequences of
gifts of life insurance policies merit further comment. The first involves
fiduciary ownership by the donor-insured of a life insurance policy previously
47. Baer v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 285, 289, aff'd, 149 F.2d 638
(8th Cir. 1945); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(c) example 6 (1958); Rev. Rul. 76-490,
1976-2 C.B. 300 (group term policy); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8006109 (1980) (same).
48, I.R.C. § 2513 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); I.R.S. Letter Ruling. 8044080
(1980).
49. Kidd v. Patterson, 230 F. Supp. 769, 774 (N.D. Ala. 1964); I.R.C. § 2523
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
50. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 256 (1941).
51. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6 (1958).
52. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 256 (1941) (by implication);
Roberts v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 679, 687 (1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1944); Lockhart v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 426,
430 (1942); Phipps v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 790, 792 (1941); Rev. Rul. 76-490,
1976-2 C.B. 300. See also Bolton v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 717, 723 (1943); Rev.
Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329 (payment of premium within three years of death
is estate tax transfer of premium amount).
53. I.R.C. § 2035(b)(2), (d)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
54. Estate of Silverman v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1975);
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 488 F.2d 575, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1973); Detroit
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F.2d 964, 969 (6th Cir. 1972); Bel v. United
States, 452 F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972); Rev. Rul.
71-497, 1971-2 C.B. 329. See also text accompanying note 28 supra.
[Vol. 47
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/3
LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
transferred to another; this fiduciary status may be either as personal
representative or trustee for the donee-owner. The other development con-
cerns the transfer tax consequences to the donor-insured and donee-owner
of a life insurance policy on the death of the donor if by the beneficiary
designation the insured is permitted to control disposition of the proceeds
until his death.
1. Fiduciary Ownership
Frequently, the donor-insured who transfers a life insurance policy by
gift to a donee is a husband (H) and the donee-owner is his wife (W). In this
common situation the will or other estate plan for W may provide that if
H survives her, he will serve as the executor and trustee of her estate. If W
dies first, Hwill own the policy in a fiduciary capacity, and if he retains the
policy until his death the estate tax problem for his estate may reappear.
Federal estate tax regulations provide that the term "incidents of owner-
ship" refers generally to the right of the insured to the economic benefits
of the policy. 5  But the regulations also state that an insured has estate tax
ownership of a policy on his life if he "has the power (as trustee or other-
wise) to change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or the
time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no beneficial
interest in the trust. "56 Although the application of this regulation to the situation
where H, the donor, is acting as testamentary trustee for W at the time of
his death is uncertain, the Internal Revenue Service in 1976 ruled that the
regulation applies even though H has no beneficial interest in the trust.57
With the exception of the Fifth Circuit,5 8 the federal courts of appeals have
uniformly rejected the application of the regulation to this situation if the
original donor-insured has no beneficial interest in the testamentary trust.5 9
The result is different if the original donor-insured is not only the trustee
but also has a beneficial interest in the trust; here the courts will impute estate
tax ownership to the donor-insured on any policy held by the trust at the
time of his death. 60
In Hunter v. United States,61 a case involving Missouri law, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the Internal Revenue
Service position in the situation where H, the donor-insured, owns a policy
55. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958).
56. Id. § 20.2042-1(c)(4) (emphasis added).
57. Rev. Rul. 76-261, 1976-2 C.B. 276.
58. Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286, 294(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 977 (1976); Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259, 265 (5th Cir. 1975).
59. Hunter v. United States, 624 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1980); Estate of
Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1972).
60. Gesner v. United States, 600 F.2d 1349, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Estate of
Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80, 86 (6th Cir. 1970); Estate of Carlton v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C. 988, 1000 (1960), rev'don other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1962).
61. 624 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1980).
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on his life as a fiduciary under the will of W, the donee. Hhad transferred
ownership of eleven policies on his life to Wover a twenty-two year period.
W named H her sole executor and testamentary trustee. After Ws death
in 1970, H served as her executor until his death in 1972. At the time of his
death, H had made no distribution of assets to the testamentary trust, nor
had he assumed any duties as testamentary trustee. Under W's will, Hhad
no beneficial interest in the income or corpus of the testamentary trust but
did have authority as executor and trustee to sell estate property, including
the life insurance policies, to any person, including himself in his individual
capacity, in order to pay death taxes and court costs or for any other proper
purpose. 62 The court concluded that H had no authority at the time of his
death, either under the will or by state law, to sell the policies to himself
and held that he did not possess incidents of ownership in the policies.6 3
Although H had not yet begun to act as testamentary trustee at the time of
his death, the court indicated its disapproval of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit and its alignment with those courts
that impute estate tax ownership to the donor-insured only if he has the right
to the economic benefits of the policy at the time of his death. 64
The United States Supreme Court has refused certiorari in a case in-
volving fiduciary ownership 65 and the conflict between the circuits remains.
The issue of fiduciary ownership has arisen in several contexts: where
the donor-insured is trustee of an irrevocable inter vivos trust he created dur-
ing his lifetime;6 6 where the donor-insured is trustee of an irrevocable inter
vivos trust created by another;67 and even where the donor-insured is trustee
of a revocable inter vivos trust created by the donee. 68 Apparently, the In-
ternal Revenue Service will assert its fiduciary ownership theory when the
insured and the settlor are not husband and wife; 69 when the insured is act-
ing as co-executor or co-trustee; 70 and when the settlor who was not the in-
sured originally applied for and purchased the insurance. 71
62. Id. at 835.
63. Id. at 840.
64. Id.
65. Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976).
66. Estate of Jordahl v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92, 93 (1975); Estate of
Carlton v. Commissioner, 34T.C. 988, 989 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d
415 (2d Cir. 1962).
67. Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 977 (1976).
69. Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1975).
70. Gesner v. United States, 600 F.2d 1349, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Terriberry
v. United States, 517 F.2d 286, 287 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976); Estate
of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80, 81 (6th Cir. 1980); Estate ofJordahl
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92, 96 (1975).
71. Rose v. United States, 511 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1975); Estate of
Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80, 81 (6th Cir. 1980).
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2. Control By Insured Without Ownership
If a donor-insured transfers all incidents of ownership in a life insurance
policy to a donee, or if a person acquires ownership of a policy of insurance
on the life of another, the donee or other owner will have the right to designate
the recipient of the proceeds of the policy on the insured's death. 72 Where
the insured and the owner of the policy are related or have common interests,
the owner of the policy may permit the insured to control the disposition
of the proceeds, e.g., to combine those proceeds with other estate assets of
the insured. Transfer tax problems to the insured and the owner of the policy
in this situation are illustrated in the opinions in Estate of Margrave,73 a Tax
Court decision affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit.
In Margrave, Wapplied for and received a decreasing term life insurance
policy on the life of her husband, H. At all times before H's death, Wowned
the policy and paid the premiums with her funds. She designated as
beneficiary the trustee of a revocable trust created by H. After H's death,
the trustee collected the proceeds and administered them as a part of H's
trust. 74 The Internal Revenue Service asserted that the proceeds were a part
of H's estate tax estate either because H held incidents of ownership in the
policy at the time of his death, or because he held a general power of ap-
pointment with respect to the proceeds of the policy. 75 Even though this ar-
rangement permitted Hto control the disposition of the proceeds at his death
and to combine the life insurance proceeds with other assets of his estate,
both the Tax Court, 6 in a reviewed opinion, and the Eighth Circuit77 con-
cluded that the proceeds were not a part of H's estate tax estate on either
theory advanced by the Internal Revenue Service. H was not an owner of
the policy by virtue of his control over the trust because Wat all times could
change the beneficiary designation.7 8 H did not have a general power of ap-
pointment at death because his power over disposition of the proceeds of
the policy was merely an expectancy. In the Eighth Circuit's view, the ex-
istence of a property interest in the policy in H at his death was a condition
to his having a power of appointment. 79 Seven members of the Tax Court
dissented from the majority view in three opinions. Six judges expressed the
opinion that H did have a general power of appointment over the proceeds
at the time of his death.8 0
72. Smith v. Smith, 313 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Mo. App., K.C. 1958).
73. 71 T.C. 13 (1978), aft'd, 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 20.
77. Estate of Margrave v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1980).
78. Id. at 37.
79. Id. at 38.
80. Judges Fay, Dawson, Simpson, Irwin, and Wilbur, 71 T.C. at 22-26, and
Judges Quealy and Simpson, 71 T.C. at 26-28, concluded that the decedent had
a general power of appointment at his death. In a separate dissent, Judge Chabot
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The Internal Revenue Service has announced that in similar cases it will
no longer assert either theory advanced in Margrave. Rather, it will insist
that W has made a completed transfer when H dies and the proceeds are
payable to H's trustee. 81 Further, if Whas an income or other interest in
the trust created by H, the transfer by W will be an estate tax transfer at
her death.82 Thus, under this ruling, transfer tax consequences are shifted
from the insured to the owner of the policy who makes the beneficiary
designation. For tax purposes, the transfer of the proceeds by the owner of
the policy is complete when the insured dies.
When the objective of the family is to combine the insurance proceeds
on the insured's life with other estate assets of the insured, and when, as
in Margrave, one spouse is the insured and the other is the owner of the in-
surance policy, the Internal Revenue Service position in the ruling may favor
taxpayers more than its position in Margrave by allowing deferral of transfer
taxes on the insurance proceeds. If the insurance proceeds are apart of H's
estate tax estate as the Internal Revenue Service asserted in Margrave, the
proceeds are exposed to estate taxes on his death. If, however, the insurance
proceeds are not a part of H's estate tax estate but Wmakes a gift or estate
tax transfer on H's death, transfer taxes may be deferred in whole or in part
until W dies.83
Will the Internal Revenue Service position in the ruling receive judicial
support? The ruling holds that when H dies the amount of the transfer is
measured by the policy proceeds, not by the lower gift tax value of the policy
determined at a time just prior to H's death. In a 1946 decision involving
similar facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that the amount of the transfer was the face value of the policy, not the gift
tax value of the policy at H's death;8 4 in that case the taxpayer conceded
that a gift tax transfer occurred at H's death. Another case supporting the
Internal Revenue Service position, from the Third Circuit, held that W,
the owner of the policy, made a completed transfer on the death of H, the
insured, under a beneficiary designation that created vested future interests
in the proceeds in her children. 5 Although some support is found for fix-
ing the amount of the transfer at the lower gift tax value of the policy,8 6 the
asserted that the proceeds were payable to the decedent's estate under I.R.C. § 2042
(1976). 71 T.C. at 28-32.
81. Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477.
82. Id.
83. W will offset any federal gift tax liability on the transfer by the transfer
tax credit available to her at that time. See I.R.C. § 2505 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
84. Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1946).
85. Estate of Pyle v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 1963).
86. In Estate of Chown v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1970), hus-
band and wife died together in an air crash. Wife owned a policy on husband's life.
The court held that the gift tax value of the policy, not the proceeds, should be
reflected in the wife's estate tax estate. Id. at 1400-01. That decision, however, was
based on a state law presumption that a husband survived his wife. The court
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better view appears to be that the transfer is complete on H's death and the
amount of the transfer is the face value of the policy.
8 7
The ruling and the cases that support it involve situations where W, the
owner of a policy on H's life, exercises her right to designate a beneficiary
under the policy. May one avoid the ruling by having H, the owner-insured,
make the beneficiary designation before he makes the gift, and then transfer
ownership of the policy to Wwho does not change the beneficiary designa-
tion, although as owner she has the legal right and power to do so? In this
situation, the Sixth Circuit has held that Wmade no transfer, noting that
inaction, acquiescence, or acceptance ofH's prior designation is not a transfer
for tax purposes. 8
There is no assurance that other courts will follow that decision. Even
if they do, the iternal Revenue Service will likely assert that if Wowns the
policy with the legal right or power to change the beneficiary designation,
she has a general power of appointment for transfer tax purposes, and her
failure to exercise that power is a gift tax transfer at the time of H's death.
The assertion that the owner of the policy has a general power of appoint-
ment over the proceeds of the policy has judicial support.8 9 Unless the courts
adopt that view, life insurance proceeds might escape transfer taxes in both
H's and W's estates, a result the Internal Revenue Service will strongly resist
and the courts will be reluctant to adopt.
discussed the question of when the transfer occurs in such a case-just before, at
the instant of, or just after the husband's death. Id. at 1398. In Estate of Goldstone,
78 T.C. 80 (1982), theTax Court in a reviewed opinion considered a case where
H and W, residents of Indiana, died in a common disaster with no evidence of sur-
vivorship. At the time of her death, Wowned a policy on H's life and had directed
that the proceeds be paid to an insurance trust created by H, in which W had a
beneficial interest, in the event she survived H. The court held that transfer tax
consequences should flow from the presumption under state law that W was the
survivor spouse. Accordingly, Wmade a gift of the matured policy-the face value
plus post-mortem dividends. Id. at 84. In dictum, the court referred to the ques-
tion whether Wmade a gift or an estate tax transfer: "Under the unified transfer
tax there will be one transfer tax imposed at the unified rates, whether the transfer
is viewed as occurring inter vivos or at death." Id. at 85.
87. See Estate of Pyle v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 1963);
Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1946). See also Kasishke
v. United States, 426 F.2d 429, 433 (10th Cir. 1970) (proceeds of endowment policy
held by insurer with interest paid to purchaser during life, remainder to son, and
no right of withdrawal properly included in estate of purchaser); Streck v. Com-
missioner, 1982 T.C.M. (CCH) 391 (July 13, 1982) (Hwas settlor of insurance
trust which owned policy on W's life; held that H made completed gift of policy
proceeds when Wdied); Rev. Rul. 77-48, 1977-1 C.B. 292; Rev. Rul. 73-207,
1973-1 C.B. 409.
88. National City Bank v. United States, 371 F.2d 13, 16 (6th Cir. 1966).
89. Keeterv. United States, 461 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Turner, 287 F.2d 821,824 (8th Cir. 1961); Rev. Rul. 55-277, 1955-1 C.B. 456.
Contra Second Nat'l Bank v. Dallman, 209 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1954).
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C. Alternative Dispositions Compared
The impact of transfer taxes will influence decisions on the ownership
of life insurance policies and the selection of a method of combining the pro-
ceeds with the insured's other property. Legislation in 1981 increasing the
transfer tax exemption level" and marital deductions 91 on qualified transfers
between spouses will have an important bearing on both ownership and
disposition of proceeds.
After 198 1, transfer of ownership of a policy from an owner-insured to
someone other than his spouse still has the transfer tax advantage of reduc-
ing the estate tax estate of the insured by the difference between the amount
of the policy's proceeds and its gift tax value.9 2 For most policies, this dif-
ference is large and the ownership transfer permits deferral or avoidance
of transfer taxes on part or all of the proceeds.
The unlimited marital deduction for qualified interspousal transfers per-
mits tax free transfer of policy ownership to a spouse while the insured is
living or of the policy proceeds on the insured's death if the insured owns
the policy. Even with an unlimited marital deduction, married persons will
continue to seek optimal use of the transfer tax exemptions available to each
of them. Property transfers between spouses, including life insurance policies,
may be necessary to do this. The unlimited marital deduction greatly
facilitates these benefits.
The fiduciary ownership problem is present if the donee of a life insurance
policy dies before the donor-insured and names the donor as his executor
or testamentary trustee. When the donee-owner outlives the donor-insured,
the donee may want to combine the insurance proceeds with the donor's
other estate property. The method chosen will have transfer tax consequences
for both the donor-insured and the donee.
The comments to follow consider those beneficiary designations which
(1) combine life insurance proceeds with other estate assets of the insured
and (2) permit the insured to retain control, directly or indirectly, over
disposition of the proceeds until his death.
1. Payment to the Estate
A, the owner-insured of a life insurance policy, may designate his estate
as beneficiary of the proceeds and thus combine the proceeds with his other
estate property. This designation exposes the proceeds to federal and
Missouri estate taxes in A's estate,9 3 but the estate tax marital deduction 94
90. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401, 95 Stat.
172, 299 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (Supp. V 1981)).
91. Id. § 403, 95 Stat. at 301-04 (codified at I.R.C. § 2056 (Supp. V 1981)).
92. For transfers of policies by gift within three years of the donor's death or
the payment of premiums by the donor on such a policy, see notes 53-54 and ac-
companying text supra.
93. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
94. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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may shelter that part of the proceeds which passes to A's spouse in a qualified
form. This designation also exposes the proceeds to the claims of A's
creditors95 and adds the proceeds to the statutory base for determining the
fees of A's executor and the executor's attorney. 96
If A is the insured and B is the owner of the policy, B may designate
A's estate as beneficiary of the proceeds and thus combine the proceeds with
A's other estate property. This designation exposes the life insurance pro-
ceeds to federal and Missouri estate taxes in A's estate,97 but the estate98 and
gift tax99 marital deductions may alleviate the transfer tax cost if B is a spouse
and beneficiary ofA's estate. This designation also exposes the proceeds to
the claims ofA's creditors' 00 and augments the statutory base for fixing the
fees of A's executor and the executor's attorney. 10 1 Does B make a gift if he
owns a policy on A's life, payable to A's estate, and the proceeds pass on
A's death to someone other than B? There is no indication now that the In-
ternal Revenue Service will assert a gift tax transfer in this situation, but
under the recent ruling'0 2 that possibility exists.
2. Payment to Revocable Trust
A popular method of combining life insurance proceeds with other estate
assets is for the owner-insured to create a revocable inter vivos trust and to
designate the trustee of that trust the beneficiary of the proceeds. After his
death, estate assets may pass by will to the trust, and the trustee of that trust
can then administer the combined property in a unified plan. Under this
method the life insurance proceeds are a part of the insured's estate tax estate
since he owns the policy at death, 0 3 but the estate tax marital deduction'0 4
may shelter the proceeds from tax costs in whole or in part if the beneficiary
is his spouse. This disposition involves the expense of a separate trust but
protects the proceeds from the claims of the insured's creditors'0 5 and keeps
the proceeds out of the statutory base used for determining the fees for the
insured's executor and the executor's attorney. 0 6
B may own a policy on A's life and designate the trustee of A's revocable
trust as beneficiary of the proceeds, combining the proceeds with A's other
95. See notes 165-67 and accompanying text infra.
96. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
97. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
98. I.R.C. 5 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
99. Id. § 2523.
100. See notes 165-67 and accompanying text infra.
101. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
102. Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477. See text accompanying notes 81-82
supra.
103. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
104. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
105. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
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estate property. This is the situation involved in Margrave and the recent
Revenue Ruling. 107 The Eighth Circuit held, 108 and the Internal Revenue
Service now concurs,109 that the proceeds are not a part ofA's estate tax estate.
But the Internal Revenue Service will assert that B makes a gift and, perhaps,
an estate tax transfer on A's death if the trust property passes in whole or
in part to someone other than B. 110
As indicated above, the ruling shifts transfer tax consequences on the
proceeds from A to B and may permit some deferral of transfer taxes on the
proceeds until B's death. The deferral feature will be important where the
amounts involved are relatively large, the period between the death of the
donor and the donee is relatively long, and A and B are not married. This
designation has the same advantage regardingA's creditors"' and the com-
putation of executors' and attorneys' fees112 as when A owns the policy and
designates the trustee of his revocable trust the beneficiary.
A disadvantage of the Margrave designation is that B makes a gift tax
transfer on A's death if someone other than B is the beneficiary ofA's trust.
This is avoided if B, the owner of the policy on A's life, creates aseparate
revocable trust and designates that trust as beneficiary of the proceeds on
A's death. If B may revoke that trust while living, he has made no gift tax
transfer of the proceeds if he is still living whenA dies. 1 3 B's revocable trust
may provide for distribution of the trust property in the manner provided
for in A's estate plan, and when B dies the property in his revocable trust
may be combined with that ofA." 4 The creation of a separate revocable trust
by B will involve some additional expense.
3. Payment to Testamentary Trustee
The insured may want to combine the insurance proceeds with his other
estate property by designating his testamentary trustee the beneficiary of
the proceeds. This designation protects the proceeds from the claims of the
creditors of his estate' 15 and from the fees of the executor and the executor's
107. See notes 73-83 and accompanying text supra.
108. Estate of Margrave v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 34, 39 (8th Cir. 1980).
109. Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-1 C.B. 477.
110. Id.
111. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text infra.
112. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
113. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1958).
114. If the terms for distribution and administration of a trust created byA are
substantially the same as those of a trust created by B, and if both trusts authorize
the mingling of the two funds, there should be no objection to combining them.
1 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 417 n.22 (2d ed. 1956); 2 id. at 1434; Note, Trusts:
Additions: Augmentation by Persons Other Than Settlor, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 585 (1963).
See also Bemis v. Fletcher, 251 Mass. 178, 146 N.E. 277 (1925).
146 N.E. 277 (1925).
115. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text infra.
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attorney, 116 and saves him the expense of creating a separate revocable trust
during his lifetime. This has been and remains a somewhat controversial
designation for reasons referenced elsewhere in these comments.
117
IfA owns the policy at the time of his death, the insurance proceeds are
a part of his estate tax estate if paid to his testamentary trustee,s but the
estate tax marital deduction may negate all or part of any transfer tax cost
if B, the beneficiary, is A's spouse.11 9 If B owns a policy on A's life and
designates A's testamentary trustee the beneficiary of the proceeds, the
transfer tax consequences should parallel those in Margrave and the Revenue
Ruling that followed that decision. 120 Transfer taxes on the proceeds are
shifted from A to B, and B makes a gift, and possibly an estate tax transfer,
on A's death.
Payment to A's testamentary trustee is the substantial equivalent of pay-
ment to a trustee of A's revocable trust since A can control the terms of his
will during his lifetime and retains control over the disposition of the in-
surance proceeds at his death so long as B does not change the beneficiary
designation in the policy. Although there are apparently no decisions or rul-
ings on this point, the reasoning in Margrave should apply since payment
of proceeds to a testamentary trustee is not equivalent to payment to the estate
under Missouri law. 121 Internal Revenue Service rulings122 and federal court
decisions1 23 involving life insurance proceeds hold that payment to A's
testamentary trustee is not a payment to A's estate under federal estate tax
law.
Payment to A's testamentary trustee when B owns the policy suggests
some possible advantages: (1) the transfer tax consequences of Margrave and
the later Revenue Ruling; (2) protection of the proceeds from the claims of
creditors; and (3) insulation of the proceeds from the statutory base used
to determine fees for executors and attorneys.
116. See notes 172-75 and accompanying text infra.
117. See Part VI. infra. See also Lawthers, supra note 14, at 320-22.
118. See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
119. I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
120. See notes 73-83 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text infra.
122. Rev. Rul. 77-157, 1977-1 C.B. 279 (trustee permitted but not directed
to pay estate obligations); Rev. Rul. 73-404, 1973-2 C.B. 319 (trustee prohibited
from paying estate obligations); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8133094 (1981) (inter vivos
trust). Contra I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7905008 (1979) (trustee directed to use trust assets
to pay estate obligations).
123. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 886, 888 (8th
Cir. 1943); Proutt's Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591, 593-94 (5th Cir. 1942);
Webster v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 514, 515 (5th Cir. 1941); Boston Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 266, 268 (1st Cir. 1938); Commissioner
v. Jones, 62 F.2d 496, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1932).
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III. CLAIMS OF CREDITORS, BENEFICIARIES, AND OTHERS
When an insured seeks to combine proceeds of insurance on his life with
his other estate property, the method he selects to accomplish this objective
can affect several interests: estate beneficiaries, including heirs at law in the
case of intestacy and legatees named in the will; his creditors and those of
his estate; fees for his personal representative and the representative's at-
torney; and his surviving spouse's marital property rights.
A. Tootle-Lacy and Prudential
Two decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court have an important bearing
on the rights of creditors and others when life insurance proceeds are com-
bined with other estate property of the insured in the manner discussed in
these comments.
In 1937 the court decided Tootle-Lacy National Bank v. Rollier.12 4 The in-
sured in Tootle-Lacy owned eight policies of insurance on his life and had
designated his wife beneficiary under each. Following his wife's incapacity,
the insured changed the beneficiary on each of the policies to the trustee of
a trust established in his will. 12 5 After the change in beneficiary designation,
the insured executed a will leaving $6,000 and his jewelry and personal ef-
fects to another woman, with a residuary bequest in trust for the benefit of
his wife during her lifetime, remainder to his son. The insured died three
months later. When his executor lacked sufficient property to pay the other
woman's bequest, she sought satisfaction from the insurance proceeds, assert-
ing that they were estate property.1 26
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's decree denying that claim
and upholding the validity of a trust of the insurance proceeds for the ex-
clusive benefit of the insured's wife and son.12 7 The court concluded that
the insured had created two trusts-one an express inter vivos trust in the
proceeds of the policy, the other a testamentary trust of the residuary estate,
if any. 128 Except for the trust property, the two trusts were identical as to
their nature, character, conditions, beneficiaries, and trustee.
In upholding the trust created by the beneficiary designation, the court
could not rely on the doctrine of incorporation by reference12 9 since the in-
124. 340 Mo. 1027, 111 S.W.2d 12 (1937).
125. Id. at 1028, 111 S.W.2d at 13.
126. Id. at 1029, 111 S.W.2d at 14.
127. Id. at 1032, 111 S.W.2d at 17.
128. Id.
129. In order to be "incorporated by reference" into a will, a document (in-
cluding a trust) must meet three requirements: (1) the will must refer to the docu-
ment with reasonable certainty; (2) the will must refer to the document as presently
existing; and (3) the testator must have intended to incorporate the document. T.
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 387-90 (2d ed. 1953). The intent
to incorporate "must clearly appear, either by direct reference ... or from un-
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sured had executed his will after naming his testamentary trustee the
beneficiary of the proceeds. The court instead indicated that an express in-
ter vivos trust may be derived from "several instruments executed at other
times than that of the transfer of title."'130 Of critical importance was the
insured's intention that the proceeds should not pass under his will as a part
of his estate. Had he intended to have them pass under his will, said the court,
"would he not have made them payable directly to the personal represen-
tative or his estate?' )131
In 1958, the court decided Prudential Insurance Company v. Gatewood,132
and reaffirmed its holding in Tootle-Lacy. In Prudential, the insured owned
accidental death policies which paid $20,000 to beneficiaries following his
accidental death in September, 1956. The insured had divorced his first wife
in February, 1956, and married his second wife two months later. After the
divorce but before the second marriage, the insured executed a will which
provided for a trust of the residue of the estate for the benefit of his minor
children. After executing the will, the insured asked the insurer to change
the beneficiary on the policies to "Citizen's Bank, Trustee of the Estate of
JohnJ. Gatewood."1 33 In July, he executed forms furnished by the insurer
containing the same beneficiary designation. The assets of the probate estate
were not sufficient to pay claims and administration expenses. The first wife
(in her own behalf), the second wife (as personal representative of the estate),
and the testamentary trustee each asserted rights to the proceeds. 134
The court followed Tootle-Lacy and upheld the claim of the testamen-
tary trustee. 3 5 Since the will was in existence at the time of the beneficiary
designation, the court concluded that the insured's purpose was "to incor-
porate by reference the terms and provisions of the trust created by the will
as the terms and provisions by which the trust created in the proceeds of
the policy was to be administered for the exclusive benefit of the children." 136
As in its earlier opinion, the court respected the insured's intentions to have
the proceeds administered apart from his estate. "Had he desired that the
proceeds of the policy be first administered as part of his estate, such desire
could easily have been effected by making the proceeds payable to his
estate."
37
Although some commentators have not endorsed Tootle-Lacy with
enthusiasm, 138 it remains the primary precedent in Missouri for a distinc-
equivocal facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction." St. Louis Union
Trust Co. v. Blue, 353 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1962).
130. 340 Mo. at 1031, 111 S.W.2d at 16.
131. Id. at 1032, 111 S.W.2d at 17.
132. 317 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958).
133. Id. at 385.
134. Id. at 384.
135. Id. at 390.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 387.
138. See Haskell, Testamentary Trustee as Insurance Beneficiary: An Estate Planning
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tion between payment of proceeds to the insured's estate and payment of
proceeds to a testamentary trustee named by the insured. In holding that
the insured created two trusts, the court implicitly approved the payment
of proceeds to the trustee of a revocable trust created by the insured while
living. For if a beneficiary designation and a later executed will establish
a valid inter vivos trust of the proceeds, then a beneficiary designation and
an existing revocable trust document will also establish a valid inter vivos
trust for disposition of the proceeds. The two-trust theory of Tootle-Lacy is
a clear indication that in Missouri there are two, not three, separate theories
for combining insurance proceeds with other estate property in the man-
ner indicated in these comments: payment to the estate, and payment to
a trust established by the insured while living. Payment to a revocable trust
and payment to a testamentary trust are, in substance and effect, the same
thing.
Neither Tootle-Lacy nor Prudential involved a beneficiary designation by
the owner of a policy who is not the insured. Someone other than the in-
sured may own a policy on the life of the insured and designate a trust created
by the insured as beneficiary of the proceeds. Unless the purported trust is
too indefinite, there is no apparent reason why the courts in Missouri should
not reach the same result as when the insured owns the policy and makes
the beneficiary designation. A trust of the proceeds created by a policy owner
who is not the insured is neither more nor less indefinite than that created
by an insured policy owner, since in each case reference must be made to
another document to determine the terms of the trust. 139
If the revocable trust or will is in existence at the time of the beneficiary
designation, the doctrine of incorporation by reference140 may be used to
fix the terms of the trust. But if the insured were later to change his will or
revocable trust without the knowledge or consent of the policy owner, a more
serious question is involved than if the policy owner and the insured were
the same person.' 4' If the insured's will or revocable trust has not been ex-
ecuted when the policy owner makes the beneficiary designation, the later
executed document also may not accurately reflect the intentions of the policy
owner. 142 These considerations might cause a court to be more reluctant to
find a valid trust of the proceeds since a necessary step in establishing or
Gimmick, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 566,578 (1966); Lawthers, supra note 14, at 316; Schip-
per, Designating Trustee Under Will As Beneficiary of Insurance Policy, 1955 A.B.A. SEC.
REAL PROP. PROB. TR. L. REP. 57, 60. For a more sympathetic view, see Note, The
Testamentary Life Insurance Trust, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1118 (1967).
139. See First Trust Co. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 204 Minn. 244,
283 N.W. 236 (1930); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1972).
140. See note 129 supra.
141. This is not a serious problem in situations like that in Estate of Margrave
v. Commissioner, 618 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980), where the insured husband and
owner wife are of one mind as to disposition of proceeds.
142. See text accompanying notes 124-28 supra.
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maintaining a trust for disposition of the insurance proceeds depends on the
actions of another individual-the execution by the insured of a revocable
trust or a will, or the modification of those documents.
B. Creditors, Administration Expenses, Heirs, and Legatees
The scope of creditors' remedies with respect to life insurance policies
and the proceeds of those policies is beyond the focus of these comments.
Interested creditors include those of the owner-insured, the policy owner
who is not the insured, the beneficiary of the proceeds, and their respective
estates. The transfer of a life insurance policy by gift or other assignment
and payment of premiums on such a policy may be fraudulent as to
creditors, 143 and the trustee in bankruptcy of an insured or beneficiary may
assert claims with respect to a policy or the proceeds of a policy. 144
Generally, life insurance policies and the proceeds of those policies receive
favored treatment under the state law of creditors' remedies. 145 Missouri
is no exception. Since 1866, Missouri has had liberal insurance exemption
statutes to protect women. 146 A married woman may insure the life of her
husband and on his death receive the proceeds free from the claims of her
husband's creditors; if she dies before her husband the proceeds are payable
to her heirs and are not subject to the claims of her creditors. 147 An unmar-
ried woman may insure the life of her father or brother and on the death
of the insured receive the proceeds free from the claims of the insured's
creditors.148 If a husband provides life insurance "for the benefit of his wife,"
the proceeds pass to her free of the claims of his creditors, executors, and
administrators, except that premium payments by the husband in excess
of five hundred dollars a year are subject to the claims of his creditors. 149
Even then, the creditor's remedy for the excess premiums does not mature
until the husband's death.'5 0 Missouri courts, even without the benefit of
statutory exemptions, have restricted recovery by creditors from life in-
surance policies and the proceeds of those policies. 151
The discussion to follow addresses only those beneficiary designations
143. SeeJudson v. Walker, 155 Mo. 166, 169, 55 S.W. 1083, 1086 (1900).
144. See Rulo v. Rubin, 468 F.2d 826, 827 (8th Cir. 1972).
145. See generally Riesenfeld, supra note 13.
146. See Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 115, §§ 15-18 (1866) (current version at id. §
376.540, .550, .560 (1978)).
147. Id. § 376.540 (1978).
148. Id. § 376.550.
149. Id. § 376.560.
150. Kansas City v. Halvorson, 352 Mo. 1027, 1029, 180 S.W.2d 710, 712
(1944).
151. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Simpson, 152 Mo. 638, 54 S.W. 506 (1899);
Baker v. Young, 47 Mo. 453 (1871); Continental Casualty Co. v. Pleitsch, 111
S.W.2d 956 (Mo. App., St. L. 1938); Renfro v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 148
Mo. App. 258, 149 S.W. 444 (St. L. 1910).
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that combine proceeds with other estate assets of the insured by payment
to the insured's estate, revocable trust, or testamentary trust.
1. Payment to the Estate
a. Estate-An Ambiguous Term
This discussion assumes that a direction to pay proceeds of a life in-
surance policy to the insured's estate will expose the proceeds to the claims
of the insured's creditors and estate beneficiaries. But unless the policy con-
tains language defining the term, a beneficiary designation to "the estate"
is ambiguous. 152
The ambiguity affects not only the creditors and estate beneficiaries
under state law but may also affect the liability for federal estate tax on the
policy proceeds. If someone other than the insured owns the policy at the
time of the insured's death, the proceeds of the policy are not subject to the
federal estate tax in the estate of the insured unless the proceeds are
"receivable by the executor" of the insured.1 53 The settled interpretation
of the quoted phrase turns on state faw; the proceeds are receivable by the
executor if they are subject to the claims of creditors under the law of the
state of the insured's domicile.154 The designation of the insured's estate as
beneficiary has prompted litigation as to the meaning of the term "estate"
for federal estate tax purposes. Decisions of the Tax Court' 55 and other federal
courts 56 reflect the ambiguity of the term.
Case law in Missouri illustrates the same ambiguity. In Renfro v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. ,' 57'an appellate court found the beneficiary
designation "estate" to be ambiguous and permitted parol evidence to
establish the insured's intention to pass the proceeds to her only son. The
court noted:
This testimony had no tendency to vary or contradict the policy but
was the explanation, by extrinsic evidence, of what took place at the
time of the delivery of the policy, of an ambiguous term, that is to
say, the term "estate" found in the policy itself....
[I]t cannot be said, with any propriety or with any proper con-
sideration of this form of insurance, that they are intended to pro-
152. See Fox, Estate: A Word To Be Used Cautiously, IfAt All, 81 HARV. L. REV.
992 (1968).
153. I.R.C. § 2042 (1976).
154. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 886, 888 (8th
Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Jones, 62 F.2d 496, 497 (6th Cir. 1932); M.B. Mor-
ton, 23 B.T.A. 236, 240 (1931); Treas. Reg. 20.2042-1(b) (1958).
155. Estate of Nyemaster, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183 (1943); Estate of Lucky, 2
B.T.A. 1268 (1925).
156. Proutt's Estate v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1942); Webster
v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1941); Commissioner v. Jones, 62 F.2d
496 (6th Cir. 1932).
157. 148 Mo. App. 258, 129 S.W. 444 (St. L. 1910).
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vide a fund for the benefit of creditors, unless that is distinctly set
out in the policy itself .... 158
Under Missouri law, death taxes are equitably apportioned among estate
beneficiaries unless the decedent's will or other estate plan directs the source
of payment for these taxes. A will clause directing the executor to pay death
taxes "assessed against my estate" has been interpreted to apply to death
taxes attributable to property passing under the will to legatees and devisees,
but not to death taxes on the proceeds of life insurance, a part of the death
tax estate, passing to a named beneficiary. 15 9
If a beneficiary designation "to my estate" is ambiguous as to the rights
of the insured's creditors and others to the policy proceeds, the ambiguity
may not be removed by designation to "my executor or administrator" or
to "my personal representative." 160 In Missouri a personal representative
has a duty to inventory the property of the decedent, including "insurance
policies payable to the personal representative."1 61 Except for exempt prop-
erty, items appearing in the inventory are presumptively available to satisfy
the claims of the creditors of the insured and his estate.162 Yet a beneficiary
designation "to my personal representative" may be ambiguous as to the
rights of creditors and others if the policy owner intends that the beneficiaries
of the proceeds shall be his legal heirs.' 63
Any ambiguity in a reference to the "estate" or to the "personal
representative" may be clarified by the terms of the policy, which may pro-
vide that a designation to either the "estate" or "the personal representative"
makes the proceeds a part of the probate estate subject to the claims of
creditors and others. Unless the policy itself removes the ambiguity, however,
it is advisable for a policy owner to write the beneficiary designationl in such
form as to clarify his intentions as to creditors and others.164
b. Rights of Interested Persons
The owner-insured of an insurance policy may designate that on his
death the proceeds of a policy be paid to his estate and intend by this designa-
tion that the proceeds become property subject to estate administration and
to the claims of his creditors. In Prudential Insurance Company v. Gatewood,165
158. Id. at 267, 270, 129 S.W. at 447-48, 450.
159. Priedeman v.Jamison, 356 Mo. 627, 631, 202 S.W.2d 900, 904 (1947).
160. Southwestern Life Ins. Corp. v. Wilson, 63 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1933).
161. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.233.1(5) (Cum. Supp. 1981). This section was
revised in 1980 to change "payable to the executor or administrator" to "payable
to the personal representative." See 1980 Mo. Laws 463.
162. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 473.233, .260, .263, .267 (1978).
163. Southwestern Life Ins. Corp. v. Wilson, 63 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1933).
164. Fox, supra note 152, at 1001-02.
165. 317 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Mo. 1958).
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the insured's personal representative was an unsuccessful claimant when
the administered estate was not sufficient to pay claims. The court indicated
that had the insured wanted the proceeds to be available to creditors he could
have designated his estate the beneficiary of the proceeds. 166
If another person owns the policy and designates that the proceeds be
paid to the insured's estate, the proceeds will also be subject to the claims
of the insured's creditors if the policy owner intends that result. In this situa-
tion, the creditors of the policy owner probably have no rights to reach the
proceeds to satisfy claims against the owner.' 67
The legatees and intestate heirs of a decedent look to the same source
for satisfaction of their rights as do the creditors of the decedent and his estate.
The amount remaining after removal of exempt property, the homestead
allowance, the satisfaction of the marital and support rights of the surviv-
ing spouse and children, and the claims of creditors passes to the heirs at
law or to the decedent's legatees. 68 Life insurance proceeds paid to the estate
become a part of that fund if the insured or other policy owner so directs.
The proceeds paid to a revocable or testamentary trust of the decedent are
not, in Missouri, a part of the estate available to the heirs at law unless the
insured or other policy owner designates his heirs to be beneficiaries of the
fund. 1 69 The clear policy of the law is to permit, even encourage, a prop-
erty owner to make dispositions of property in this manner which are
substitutes for what would otherwise be testamentary dispositions. In Tootle-
Lacy National Bank v. Rollier,170 the unsuccessful claimant was a pecuniary
legatee named in the insured's will; the court held that payment of insurance
proceeds to the decedent's testamentary trustee was for the exclusive benefit
of the beneficiaries of that trust. Under the court's theory, the beneficiaries
of the testamentary trust participate as beneficiaries of an express inter vivos
trust and not as residuary legatees under the will.17 1
A personal representative has authority to pay expenses incident to the
administration of an estate. 172 These expenses are payable from the same
fund available to satisfy the debts and other liabilities of the decedent ac-
crued at the time of death. 73 A major expense of administration is the fee
of the personal representative 74 and his attorney.175 The proceeds of a life
insurance policy payable to the insured's estate become part of the personal
property administered and will increase the minimum compensation for the
personal representative and the attorney for the personal representative.
166. Id.
167. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text supra.
168. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.010 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
169. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text supra.
170. 340 Mo. 1027, 1032, 111 S.W.2d 12, 17 (1937).
171. Id.
172. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 473.403.2, .810(20) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
173. Id. 55 473.387, .397, .403, .540, .543.
174. Id. 55473.153.1, .2 (supervised); .823 (independent).
175. Id. 55473.153.1, .3; .823(3).
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2. Payment to Revocable Trust
Probably the most common method for combining life insurance pro-
ceeds with other estate assets of the insured is for the insured owner of the
policy to create a revocable trust and to designate the trustee the beneficiary
of the proceeds of the policy. 176 In some states, legislation addresses the rights
of creditors and others to the policy proceeds paid to the trustee of a revocable
trust. 177 Missouri has not yet adopted such legislation, 178 and creditors, heirs,
and legatees of the insured may not reach the proceeds. The Tootle-Lacy and
Prudential opinions are the strongest indication that Missouri courts will
respect the insured's intentions and insulate insurance proceeds from claims
enforceable only against property subject to estate administration.
If someone other than the insured owns the policy and designates the
trustee of a revocable trust created by the insured as beneficiary of the pro-
ceeds, reasons for insulating the proceeds from claims of the insured's
creditors, heirs, and legatees are just as strong as when the insured owns
the policy.1 79 In such a case the policy owner may designate any person, in-
cluding himself, as beneficiary of the proceeds, and if he dies before the in-
sured, the policy is an asset of his estate. 180 Unless a prior transfer of the
176. See G. BOGERT, supra note 12, § 235, at 57.
177. Id. at 87 n.50.
178. A Subcommittee for Revision of Missouri Trust Law of the Missouri Bar
Probate and Trust Committee has proposed adding a new section 456.030 govern-
ing insurance trusts and placing the language of the existing section 456.030 into
section 456.010. This recommendation was introduced as H.R. 1733 in the 81st
General Assembly, but the House took no action on the bill. The language of the
proposed new section is as follows:
Proceeds of life insurance policies heretofore made payable to a trustee
or trustees named as beneficiary or hereafter to be named beneficiary under
an inter vivos trust shall be paid directly to the trustee or trustees and held
and disposed of by the trustee or trustees as provided in the trust agree-
ment or declaration of trust in Writing made and in existence on the date
of death of the insured, whether or not such trust or declaration of trust
is amendable or revocable or both, or whether it may have been amended,
and notwithstanding the reservation of any or all rights of ownership under
the insurance policy or annuity contract; subject however, to a valid assign-
ment of any part of the proceeds. It is not necessary to the validity of such
trust agreement or declaration of trust that it be funded or have a corpus
other than the right, which need not be irrevocable, of the trustee or trustees
named therein to receive such proceeds as beneficiary. A policy of life in-
surance or annuity contract may designate as beneficiary a trustee or
trustees named or to be named by will if the designation is made in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the policy or contract whether or not the
will is in existence at the time of the designation.
H.R. 1733, 81st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1982).
179. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text supra.
180. J. MUNCH, supra note 40, at 126-27, 143-44.
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policy by the insured is in some sense fraudulent, 8 ' a court should give pro-
ceeds the protection accorded by Tootle-Lacy and Prudential.
The owner of a policy on the life of another may create a revocable in-
ter vivos trust using the same plan of disposition as that in the insured's own
estate plan. If the insured dies before the policy owner, the insurance pro-
ceeds may eventually be combined with other estate property of the
insured. 8 2 Creditors, heirs, and legatees of the insured should have no claim
to the proceeds on the insured's death unless a prior transfer of the policy
by the insured is in some sense fraudulent.
A Missouri statute makes void, as against existing or subsequent
creditors, a conveyance in trust to the use of the grantor.'8 3 A revocable life
insurance trust created by the insured may constitute a transfer for the benefit
of the insured, and while he is living his creditors would have the same rights
with respect to the policy as if the trust had not been created. But once the
insured is dead, his creditors should have no greater rights to the proceeds
than if he owned the policy at death and designated his beneficiary as some-
one other than the trustee of a revocable trust.'8 4
3. Payment to Testamentary Trustee
Several states have legislation authorizing payment of life insurance pro-
ceeds to a testamentary trustee designated by the insured. 185 Some of these
statutes address the rights of creditors and others and commonly provide
that the insurance proceeds paid to a testamentary trust are insulated from
the claims of the insured's creditors.186 Although Missouri has not yet enacted
181. SeeJudson v. Walker, 155 Mo. 166, 169, 55 S.W. 1083, 1086 (1900).
182. A trust created in the testamentary estate plan of the insured and the
revocable trust created by the owner of the policy would have the same dispositive
provisions and each document would authorize the combination of the two trusts
for the purpose of administration. See note 114 supra.
183. Mo. REV. STAT. § 428.010(1978). The statute refers to a "deed of gift and
conveyance ofgoods and chattels, in trust." Typically, the grantor of a revocable life
insurance trust designates the trustee the beneficiary of the proceeds and reserves
the right to retain possession of the policy itself and to change the beneficiary
designation.
184. See notes 124-42 and accompanying text supra.
185. See G. BOGERT, supra note 12, § 239, at 89 n.55.
186. New York, for example, has specific legislation dealing with creditors'
rights in insurance proceeds:
(c) Except to the extent otherwise provided by the trust agreement,
declaration of trust or will, proceeds received by the trustee shall not be
subject to the debts of the insured, employee or participant, to any greater
extent than if such proceeds were payable to the beneficiaries named in
the trust, and for all purposes including transfer or estate tax purposes they
shall not be deemed payable to or for the benefit of the estate of the insured,
employee or participant.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-3.3(c) (McKinney 1973).
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such legislation, 18 7 the Missouri Supreme Court, in Tootle-Lacy and
Prudential,188 has held that an insured's intention and direction to pay the
proceeds to a testamentary trust will be respected and his creditors may not
assert their claims against the proceeds. Under the reasoning of Tootle-Lacy,
the rights of creditors and others to the proceeds paid to a testamentary trust
should be the same as for proceeds payable to a revocable trust.1 89
IV. MARITAL RIGHTS OF SPOUSE
In the context of this discussion, marital property rights become impor-
tant in two instances: on dissolution of marriage and on the death of a spouse.
On dissolution, a Missouri court has authority to make a just division of
the marital property of the spouses. 190 Subject to certain exceptions, marital
property is all property acquired subsequent to marriage. 191 Missouri deci-
sions establish that a life insurance policy acquired during marriage is marital
property. 192 The ownership of a life insurance policy, 193 the designation of
the beneficiary,194 and the duty to make premium payments' 95 may be deter-
mined by the parties to a dissolution proceeding by agreement' 96 or a court
by decree.197 A policy owner who is obligated by contract or decree to main-
tain a designation in favor of a former spouse or children cannot designate
187. For a proposed Missouri statute, see note 178 supra.
188. See notes 124-37 and accompanying text supra.
189. See text accompanying notes 124-42 supra.
190. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
191. Id. § 452.330.2.
192. LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 581 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979)
(policy with cash surrender value was marital property); Hilger v. Hilger, 570
S.W.2d 736, 741 (Mo. App., K.G. 1978) (cash award to wife for marital property
represented by insurance policies with cash surrender value held by the parties).
Where there was no evidence to indicate the cash value added by premium payments
from family funds, an award to the insured husband was held to be proper. In re
Marriage of Pitluck, 616 S.W.2d 861, 862-63 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981). In several
decisions, Missouri courts have indicated that term insurance policies with no cash
surrender or loan value should be awarded to the insured. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Biancard, 611 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); Nilges v. Nilges, 610
S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980); In re Marriage of Robinson, 570 S.W.2d
320, 322 (Mo. App., W.D. 1978).
193. LoPiccolo v. LoPiccolo, 581 S.W.2d 421, 425 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979);
Hilger v. Hilger, 570 S.W.2d 736, 741 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
194. Perry v. Perry, 484 S.W.2d 257, 258-59 (Mo. 1972); General Am. Life
Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 539 S.W.2d 693, 697-98 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 421 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Mo. App., St. L. 1967).
195. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Marcoulier, 322 F. Supp. 246, 250 (E.D.
Mo. 1971).
196. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.325 (1978).
197. Id. § 452.330.
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someone else as beneficiary or combine the proceeds with other estate assets
in a manner inconsistent with his obligation. 198
Under Missouri law, a gift by a married person in fraud of the marital
rights of a surviving spouse may be recovered from the donee and applied
to the surviving spouse's share, determined in the same manner as an elec-
tive forced share. 199 The elective forced share is available when it is more
advantageous to the surviving spouse than accepting the property otherwise
passing from the decedent to the spouse. 200 Before 1981, the estate subject
to an elective forced share included only property subject to administration
in the decedent's estate,2 0 1 but beginning that year the estate on which the
elective forced share is based includes not only property passing under the
decedent's will but also certain nonprobate property passing to the surviv-
ing spouse, including life insurance proceeds. 20 2 Under the legislation now
in effect, a surviving spouse must offset certain property he receives out-
side the will, including life insurance proceeds, against a proportionate share
of the augmented estate. 20 3 Only if the elective forced share of the estate
reduced in this manner exceeds in value the property otherwise received will
the surviving spouse normally elect to take against the will. 20 4
A recent Missouri appellate decision, Bishop v. Eckhard,20 5 involves both
features of marital rights law in Missouri: dissolution and death. The dece-
dent husband participated in employee benefit plans maintained by his
employer, one of which, a life insurance plan, permitted the decedent to
designate the beneficiary of the proceeds and to change the beneficiary
anytime prior to death. After his wife filed for dissolution of their marriage,
the decedent changed the beneficiary designation from his wife to his
daughter. He died while the dissolution proceeding was still pending.20 6 The
court affirmed an award of the insurance proceeds to the daughter and re-
jected the wife's contention that the change in the beneficiary designation
was a transfer in fraud of her marital rights. 20 7 Without extended discus-
sion, the court held that the beneficiary designation in effect at the time of
death controlled the disposition of the proceeds. 20 8 The wife also contend-
ed that she had acquired rights in the policy as a result of the dissolution
proceeding. The court rejected this theory, noting that the husband's death
198. 322 F. Supp. at 250-51. See G. BOGERT, supra note 12, § 239, at 89 n.55.
199. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.150 (1978).
200. Id. § 474.160. A surviving spouse may rescind a forced share election if
it appears that provision made for the spouse under the will is more advantageous
than the elective forced share. Id. § 474.163.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
201. Id. § 474.160.1(1) (1978) (repealed 1980).
202. Id. § 474.163.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981) (effective January 1, 1981).
203. Id. § 474.163.1 (1978).
204. See note 200 supra.
205. 607 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980).
206. Id. at 717.
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rendered the dissolution proceeding moot and terminated the court's
jurisdiction. 20 9
The decision in Bishop is yet another indication of the favored status of
life insurance proceeds. In holding that a change in the beneficiary designa-
tion from wife to daughter was not a transfer in fraud of the wife's marital
rights, the court expressed the prevailing view that the owner of a policy with
the right to change the beneficiary designation may do so at any time. 210
The policy in question was owned and maintained by the decedent's
employer, and the opinion gives no indication that the decedent had any
rights while living to a cash surrender, loan, or other value in the policy.
A more difficult case is presented if the decedent owns a policy with a
large cash surrender value and, immediately before death, changes the
beneficiary designation from his spouse to his child. Even there, courts will
be reluctant to intervene, for a decision in favor of the wife would create
doubt about the efficacy of any beneficiary change where a spouse was the
existing beneficiary. Nonetheless, a beneficiary change just before death,
intended to divert family resources from the spouse to someone else, might
be manifestly unfair to the spouse if the life insurance was the decedent's
principal asset.
The 1981 change in the elective forced share legislation probably does
not change the result in Bishop. The newly enacted forced share election in-
creases the estate subject to the election by adding insurance proceeds and
other nonprobate property passing to the spouse, and then reduces the forced
share by the amount of these proceeds and other property. 21 ' After this
legislative change it will be even more difficult for a surviving spouse to
establish elective forced share marital rights in life insurance proceeds passing
to someone else. Had the legislature intended to broaden the estate subject
to the election by including life insurance proceeds passing to someone other
than the spouse, it could have done so in the new legislation. The change
actually made may be read as legislative approval of Bishop.
A 1981 amendment to the marital dissolution legislation provides that
marital rights shall "vest" on filing of a petition in a dissolution proceeding.2 12
It is doubtful if the result in Bishop would have been different if the vesting
language added in 1981 had been in the statute at the time the wife filed her
dissolution petition in that case. The likely purpose of the vesting language
209. Id. at 717-18.
210. See cases cited note 1 supra. In Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 317
S.W.2d 382 (Mo. 1958), the insured's second wife asserted that a beneficiary
designation in favor of the insured's testamentary trustee, made by the insured after
their marriage, was a fraud as to her. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected that
contention, noting that all or nearly all of the premiums were paid before marriage
and the beneficiary designation removed the property from the insured's estate.
Id. at 387-88.
211. MO. REV. STAT. §474.163 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
212. Id. § 452.330.3.
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is to assist the parties in establishing that no taxable income tax exchange
takes place when the parties make a property settlement incident to a
dissolution. 213 Even with the vesting language in the statute, the courts will
probably hold that on termination of the dissolution proceeding by the volun-
tary action of either or both of the spouses or by death of one of the spouses,
the vested marital rights now provided in the statute cease. 214
V. CONCLUSION
Life insurance proceeds are often an important part of an estate plan.
Combining the proceeds with other property of the decedent in a single estate
plan can help to carry out the decedent's wishes efficiently and economically.
In any individual case, the choice of a method to combine life insurance
proceeds with other estate property will depend on the particular objectives
sought. Each of the methods available-payment to the estate, to a revocable
trust, or to a testamentary trustee-has advantages, and each must be ex-
amined in terms of its impact on transfer taxes and the rights of creditors,
beneficiaries, spouses, and other interested persons.
VI. APPENDIX
It is reported from time to time that some insurers are reluctant or un-
willing to accept a beneficiary designation that combines life insurance pro-
ceeds with the insured's other property in the manner discussed in these com-
ments. Uncertainty about the-legal consequences of such a designation has
been mentioned as a reason for the insurer to refuse to accept such a
designation.
The author of this Article asked a leading national life insurance com-
pany to respond to questions concerning its willingness to accept such a
designation under assumed circumstances. The situation, the author's ques-
tions, and the insurer's responses are set out below.
213. In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), a case involving Delaware
law, a marital property settlement involved a taxable exchange to the transferor
husband. But in Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975), decided under
a Colorado marital property law similar to Missouri's, the court held that a marital
property settlement was a division of property jointly owned by the spouses and
was not a taxable exchange to the husband. The Missouri statute now provides:
"Each spouse has a common ownership in marital property which vests not later
than the time of commencement by one spouse against the other of an action in
which a final decree is entered for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, the
extent of the vested interest to be determined and finalized by the courts pursuant
to the chapter." MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
214. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981). Vesting is tied to an ac-
tion in which a final decree is entered.
690 [Vol. 47
30




Insured A, a Missouri resident, owns a policy on his life. The
insurance is an individual policy and may be either term or
whole life. A may want to transfer the ownership of the policy
to B, also a Missouri resident, and if the transfer of ownership
is made, it will be in a manner consistent with the terms of the
policy and any state laws which may be involved, including those
which protect creditors and spouses from fraudulent transfers.
A. Payment to the Estate
Question 1: Will you accept a beneficiary designation made by A which
in effect provides for payment of the proceeds on A's death to the executor
or administrator of A's estate, the proceeds to be held and administered as
a part of A'9 estate?
Answer: Yes.
Question 2: If A transfers ownership of the policy to B, and B is A's
spouse, will you accept a beneficiary designation by B which in effect pro-
vides for payment of proceeds on A's death to the executor or administrator
of A's estate?
Answer: Yes.
Question 3: Same question as 2, except B is not A's spouse?
Answer: Yes.
B. Payment to Revocable Trust
Question 4: Will you accept a beneficiary designation made by A that
directs that the proceeds be paid to the trustee of a revocable trust created
by A, which is adequately identified in the beneficiary designation?
Answer: Yes.
Question 5: Do you insist on inclusion of a savings or other protective
clause of some kind as part of the beneficiary designation which protects the
insurance company in the event there is a dispute over the proceeds after
A's death between the trustee of the revocable trust and other persons?
Answer: Yes. The language of the protective clause is:
It is understood and agreed that [the insurer] shall not be responsi-
ble for any failure of a trustee to perform the duties of trustee nor
for the application or disposition of any money paid to a trustee and
such payment shall fully discharge [the insurer] for the amount so
paid.
Question 6: IfA transfers ownership of the policy to B and B is A's spouse,
will you accept a beneficiary designation by B directing payment of the pro-
ceeds on A's death to the trustee of the revocable trust created by A which
is adequately identified in the beneficiary designation?
Answer: Yes. See also response to question 5.
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Question 7: Same question as 6, except that B is not A's spouse?
Answer: Yes. See also response to question 5.
C. Payment to Testamentary Trustee
Note: One purpose of this designation may be to insulate the proceeds
from claims and liabilities which may be enforced against A's estate.
Question 8: Will you accept a beneficiary designation made by A which
directs payment of the proceeds to the trustee of a testamentary trust pro-
perly identified in A's will?
Answer: Yes.
Question 9: Do you insist on inclusion of a savings or other protective
clause to protect the company from the possible claims ofA's creditors, heirs,
legatees, etc.?
Answer: Yes. See response to question 5 for language of the protective
clause. In addition, provision is made for the possibility that the insured may
die intestate, leave a will which contains no trust, or leave a will that is not
probated.
Question 10: If A transfers ownership of the policy to B and B is A's
spouse, will you accept a beneficiary designation by B directing payment
of the proceeds on A's death to a trustee of a testamentary trust properly
identified in A's will?
Answer: Yes, but see response to question 9 for protective clause and
provision for contingencies.
Question 11: If A transfers ownership of the policy to B, who is not A's
spouse, will you accept a beneficiary designation by B directing payment
of the proceeds on A's death to a trustee of a testamentary trust properly
identified in A's will?
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